

Trojans Modifying Soft-Processor Instruction Sequences Embedded in FPGA Bitstreams

İsmail San, Nicole Fern, Çetin Kaya Koç and Kwang-Ting (Tim) Cheng

University of California Santa Barbara
Anadolu University

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FPGA Bitstream Security

- *Soft-core processors* implemented using FPGAs are used in many critical embedded systems
 - Ubiquitous computing, e.g. IoT, Avionics, Intellectual Property
- Soft-core processor instructions stored in **block memories** embedded in bitstream
 - Program codes are usually *infinite loops*: they will continue to execute until the processor is turned off
 - **Usually these instructions are difficult to extract from the bitstream because memory contents are encoded**
- If attacker modifies an FPGA bitstream without disrupting normal design operation, will the modification be detected?
 - Bitstream modification occurs after place and route, so only CRC checksums have the ability to detect modifications and these can be easily disabled^{1,2}

¹R. S. Chakraborty et al. "Hardware Trojan Insertion by Direct Modification of FPGA Configuration Bitstream". In: *IEEE Design Test 2* (2013).

²Tim Güneysu, Igor Markov, and André Weimerskirch. "Securely Sealing Multi-FPGA Systems". In: *Proceedings of the 8th Int. Conf. on Reconfigurable Computing: Architectures, Tools and Applications*. 2012.

Attack Scenario

- *Threat Model*
 - Program code performing critical function located in FPGA block RAM
 - Attacker can obtain the bitstream then re-introduce a modified bitstream to the FPGA but has no access to RTL code or original program code
- **Our Contributions**
 - 1 **Algorithm to decode instructions residing in the FPGA bitstream** allowing attacker to reverse engineer the program
 - 2 **Methodology to identify code portions** that are involved with some important process, say encryption
 - 3 **Methodology to manipulate the code** by injecting a few extra instructions leak information without changing the functionality of the original code

Case Study: Trojan Insertion in AES Instruction Sequence

```
518: 3c020000 lui v0,0x0
51c: 8c471308 lw a3,4872(v0)
520: 00042100 sll a0,a0,0x4
524: 3c020000 lui v0,0x0
528: 24850004 addiu a1,a0,4
52c: 24421258 addiu v0,v0,4696
530: 00452821 addu a1,v0,a1
534: 24e80010 addiu t0,a3,16
538: 24a3fffc addiu v1,a1,-4
53c: 00e01021 move v0,a3
540: 90640000 lbu a0,0(v1)
544: 90460000 lbu a2,0(v0)
548: 24630001 addiu v1,v1,1
54c: 00862026 xor a0,a0,a2
550: 0c00012d jal 4b4 #UARTWriteByte
554: a0440000 sb a0,0(v0)
558: 14a3fffa bne a1,v1,540 #AddRoundKey+0x28
55c: 24420001 addiu v0,v0,1
560: 24e70004 addiu a3,a3,4
564: 14e8fff5 bne a3,t0,538 #AddRoundKey+0x20
568: 24a50004 addiu a1,a1,4
56c: 03e00008 jr ra
570: 00000000 nop
```

Listing 1: AddRoundKey Code Segment

- Code segment from MIPS instruction sequence
- Corresponds to the AddRoundKey step in AES
- Compiled with MIPS cross-compiler toolchain from the C code available online³
- The red instruction is the injected jump-and-link instruction to the UART channel write subroutine

³<https://github.com/kokke/tiny-AES128-C>

Properties of the Trojan

- Novelty:
 - *Trojan* CPU instructions are injected by manipulating the **block memory** contents at the bitstream level
- Strength:
 - Powerful Trojans without extra logic
 - Not possible to trace the trojan insertion during logic synthesis and place-and-route processes
- Caveat:
 - Unencrypted bitstream is needed
 - However, there are practical side-channel attacks on bitstream encryption mechanisms

Concluding Remarks

- Motivation
 - *Cryptographic architectures* or *CPUs* have many fixed values in their design specifications embedded in bitstream
- **Key Contributions**
 - 1 **General model** for creating a covert Program code at the Bitstream level
 - 2 Information transmitted/leaked by *injecting existing instructions only to yield an information leakage* without changing the functionality of the original program code
 - 3 We avoid most of the existing verification mechanisms since it is introduced after Place & Route